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FXA ON IP: STRIKING A BALANCE IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES
Robert Penchina 2

Judge Frank X. Altimari had great faith that, if given the
chance, most people would, as he liked to say, "do the right
thing." In his personal dealings, the Judge was loath to instruct
anyone as to what was the right thing for them to do. Of course,
he was not at all shy about telling them what he would do if he
found himself in their position, and he would make sure they
knew the possible negative outcomes that might await someone
who made the wrong choice. But, he would not go so far as to
tell them what they should do. Rather, he was confident that if
people knew the facts, their conscience and intellect would lead
them to do the right thing.
In many ways, this personal style carried over into how Judge
Altimari conducted himself as a judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Judge Altimari had great faith
in the wisdom and experience of his judicial colleagues in the
district courts. Thus, Judge Altimari was not fond of "brightline" tests or per se rules. While many prefer the simplicity of a
bright-line, Judge Altimari believed that such rules too restricted
trial court judges from applying their knowledge and experience
to the situations before them. Instead, Judge Altimari favored
balancing tests, where the facts as found could be weighed,
' The author is a member of Rogers & Wells LLP and head of that firm's
copyright and trademark practice. He served as law clerk to Judge Frank X.
Altimari from 1988 to 1990.
2 I had the astoundingly good luck to have had a chance to serve as a law
clerk to the late Honorable Frank X. Altimari. Although I did not realize it at
the time, when Judge Altimari asked you to become his clerk, it was not as
much a job offer as an invitation to be part of his family. To all of us who
were his clerks, Judge Altimari was a second father and a friend for life. We
profoundly miss him.
I am greatly honored that the editors of the Touro Law Review asked me to
be a part of this issue honoring the memory of Judge Altimari. I only wish
that such an issue would not have been necessary for many decades hence.
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measured and evaluated by an experienced jurist who, without
being boxed-in by a higher court, would know just what was the
right thing to do in any given situation. Although balancing tests
are more difficult to administer than bright-line rules, Judge
Altimari saw them as enabling judges to do the right thing.
Judge Altimari's disdain for bright-line tests can be seen in
some of the intellectual property cases in which he authored the
Second Circuit's opinion, such as Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics
World Corporation,3 Aymes v. Bonelli,4 and Soltex Polymer
Corporationv. Fortex Industries, Inc.5 Generally, these cases
reflect Judge Altimari's desire that a result not be automatic but
emerge from a case-by-case balancing.
Titan Sports
In Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corporation,6 Judge
Altimari enunciated a test to balance an individual's right to
control the use of his name and likeness against the first
amendment's protection for free expression. The case pitted
Titan Sports, Inc. ("Titan"), a promoter of professional wrestling
events under the trademark "World Wrestling Federation" and
holder of rights in the names and likenesses of wrestlers such as
Hulk Hogan, against Comics World Corporation ("Comics
World"), the publisher of "Wrestling
Magazine," and other similar articles. 7

All-Stars

Poster

The "magazines" at issue, in large part, consisted of oversized
photographs of wrestlers.' These photographs were folded and
stapled in between the magazines' covers such that the
photographs essentially could not be viewed unless unstapled and
removed from the magazines. 9 The magazines' covers announced
3 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989).

' 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
5 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987).
6870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989).
7 Id. at 85-86.
8
d.at 86.
9Id.
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that they contained "10 FULL COLOR WRESTLING
POSTERS! HUGE SIZE!"1 °
It was undisputed that neither Titan nor any of the individual
wrestlers depicted in the oversized photographs had consented to
the use of their likenesses in this manner." Titan brought suit,
alleging that Comics World's unauthorized use of the names and
likenesses of Titan's wrestlers in Comics World's wrestling
"Poster Magazines" constituted a violation of New York Civil
Rights Law section 51, which prohibits the commercial
exploitation of an individual's personality without his consent.1 2
The district court rejected Titan's claim. 3 Ruling on the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court held that
defendants' "use of over-sized photos is protected by the First
Amendment," and dismissed Titan's complaint. 4
Underlying the court's determination was its findings that
"defendants' product is a bona fide newsstand publication," 15 and
"the constitutional freedom of the press does not stop at 8" by
11. "16 Thus, although the defendants' own publication identified
the photographs at issue as posters, the district court did not
follow prior cases holding that the sale of posters without consent
of the person depicted constitutes a violation of Section 51. v In
the district court's strict application of the first amendment, the
fact that the defendants in Brinkley and Factors "were not selling
magazines"' 8 made all the difference. Using the district court's
bright line, once a product can be classified as a "magazine" or a
"bona fide newsstand publication," it is entitled to the full

10 Id.

" Id. at 86-87.
12 N.Y.
3 Titan

Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1998).
Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y.

rev'd, 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989).
1988),
14

1d. at 1323.

" Id. at 1319.

'6 Id. at 1322.
17Id. (distinguishing Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428 (lst Dep't
1981) and Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978)).
18 Id.
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protection of the first amendment and thus, does not violate
section 51.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings. 19 Writing for the court, Judge Altimari stated that,

contrary to the district court's holding, "[t]he determination that a
product is 'a bona fide newsstand publication . .

.'

does not

resolve the conflict."2" Rather, an "item physically attached
within the covers of a magazine... is not automatically entitled
21
to first amendment protection."
In Judge Altimari's view, "a court must be ever mindful of the
inherent tension between the protection of an individual's right to
control the use of his likeness and the constitutional guarantee of
free dissemination of ideas, images and newsworthy matter."2"
To Judge Altimari, bright-line rules and automatic results simply
did not adequately address that tension. "For example, Comics
World could not staple a T-shirt bearing the likeness of a Titan
wrestler between magazine covers and claim exemption from
section 51 and first amendment protection for a 'wrestling T-shirt
magazine.'"2

Instead, the tension best could be addressed in

Judge Altimari's view by use of a balancing test that enables
district court judges to do the right thing.
Thus, in lieu of talismanic incantations of the first amendment
and a determination whether the product is part of a magazine,
Judge Altimari instructed that "the fact finder should consider a
variety of factors including, but not limited to, the nature of the
item, the extent of its relationship to the traditional content of a
magazine, the ease with which it may be detached from the
magazine, whether it is suitable for use as a separate product
once detached and how the publisher markets the item." 4
Although harder to apply than a per se rule, this balancing test
permits judges to be guided by their experience in resolving the
'9 870

F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1985).

20 Id. at 88.
21 id.

2 Id.

3 id.
24

Id. at 89.
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tensions between the first amendment and individuals' rights to
prevent commercialization of their names and likenesses.
Aymes v. Bonelli
In Aymes v. Bonelli, s Judge Altimari, writing for the Second
Circuit, addressed a dispute concerning ownership of the
copyright in a computer program between a computer
programmer and the company for whom he had created a
particular program.
The outcome turned on whether the
programmer was an employee of the company, in which case the
company would own the copyright under the work-made-for-hire
doctrine,' or an independent contractor, in which case copyright
ownership would vest with the programmer who authored the
work.27
Three and a half years before Judge Altimari wrote in Aymes,
the Supreme Court addressed the work-made-for-hire issue in
Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.' Prior to Reid,
the Circuits had been split as to whether a party who was an
"independent contractor" within-the general understanding of that
term could nevertheless be considered an "employee" for
purposes of copyright law and the work-made-for-hire doctrine. 9
In Reid, the Court made clear that the "employee" prong of the
work-made-for-hire provision was intended to apply only to true
2'980 F.2d 857
26 17 U.S.C. §§

(2d Cir. 1992).
101, 201(a) (1994).

271d. §§ 101, 201(a).
Under the Copyright Act, certain enumerated
categories of works prepared by independent contractors are eligible to be
works made for hire. However, the independent contractor prong of the workmade-for-hire provision requires that the parties enter into a written agreement
confirming their intention that the work at issue be a work made for hire. Id.
§ 101. In Aymes, there was no written agreement between the programmer
and the company; thus, the program could be a work made for hire only if the
programmer was found to be an employee. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 860.
2 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
' See, e.g., Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy
Enter., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987); Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. SchockHopchas Publ'g. Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987); Aldon Accessories, Ltd.
v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
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employees, rather than independent contractors, and set forth a
test for determining whether any given work was prepared by an
employee or an independent contractor.3" The Court instructed
that courts should apply the "principles of general common law
of agency [to determine] whether the work was prepared by an
31 and it identified twelve
employee or an independent contractor,"
32
factors "relevant to this inquiry."
While a lengthy series of factors was consistent with Judge
Altimari's favored approach, he wished to make clear to all that
"the Reid test was not intended to be applied in a mechanistic
fashion., 33 Judge Altimari was concerned that, rather than
exercising the judgment born of their own experience on the
bench, judges might simply add up the Reid factors and award
victory to the party with the most points. Indeed, this is what the
district court had done in Aymes. 34 Thus, he admonished that
"[t]he factors should not merely be tallied but should be weighed
according to their significance in the case."31
Consistent with how he acted off the bench, Judge Altimari let
the world know which of the Reid factors he thought were most
significant, 36 and which were "virtually meaningless. "3 But, he
3o Reid, 490 U.S. at 744-53.
3' Id. at 751.
32 Id. (the factors

are the: skill required; source of instrumentalities or tools;

location of the work; duration of the relationship between the parties; right to
assign additional projects; extent of hired party's discretion over when and
how long to work; method of payment; hiring and paying of assistants;
whether work is part of hiring party's regular business; whether hiring party is
in business; provision of benefits; and tax treatment of hired party).
33
Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862.
34Id. at 861.
35 Id.
36
Judge Altimari designated the following as the significant factors:
(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means
of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of
employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired party;
and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party... will almost always
be relevant and should be given more weight in the analysis,
because they will usually be highly probative of the true
nature of the employment relationship.
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made clear that what he was doing was "review[img] each of the
factors and consider[ing] their relative importance in this case."s
Thus, the relative importance of the factors could-and perhaps in
his view should-differ in other cases. In Judge Altimari's view,
it was up to the individual judges to strike the appropriate balance
of the factors presented to them on a case-by-case basis.
Soltex
Judge Altimari's dislike for mechanically derived results
extended to the granting of remedies as well as to determinations
of liability. This is illustrated by Judge Altimari's opinion in
Soltex Polymer Corporationv. Fortex Industries,Inc."
In Soltex, the Second Circuit reviewed a trademark
infringement claim rising from two companies' use of the mark
FORTIFLEX in connection with their products.' The district
court found the defendant's use of the FORTIFLEX mark to be
infringing but, to the plaintiff's chagrin, did not enjoin defendant
from continuing to use the mark.41 Instead, the court found that a
disclaimer used by defendant was sufficient to dispel any
likelihood of confusion and thus was a sufficient remedy. 42 The
plaintiff appealed.
Posing the issue on appeal in the first lines of the Second
Circuit's opinion, Judge Altimari wrote that "[tihis case presents
the interesting question of whether a finding of any likelihood of
consumer confusion between two products bearing the same mark
necessarily mandates the use of an absolute injunction in favor of

Id.
' "The authority to hire assistants' is also virtually meaningless in a situation
where the hired party does not need assistance." Id. at 864.
3 Id. at 862 (emphasis added).
39 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987).
oThe plaintiff used the FORTIFLEX much in connection with a plastic resin
product, while the defendant utilized the mark on animal feeders and industrial
containers. Id. at 1326-27.
41 Id. at 1328.
42
d. at 1330.
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the owner of that trademark.
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One need not read any further

into the opinion to know that Judge Altimari would not curtail the
trial judge's exercise of discretion by mandating an absolute
remedy.
Rather, Judge Altimari explained that the Second Circuit had
"emphasized before the 'flexible approach'" to remedies for
trademark infringement, and previously "rejected expressly an
'all-or-nothing' or per se rule mandating the use of an absolute
injunction."' These prior pronouncements of the Second Circuit
utterly were in sync with Judge Altimari's own judicial
philosophy. Instead of mandating a result that trial courts would
be bound to reach, Judge Altimari believed that the right thing
would be done if the remedy were left to "the district court's
careful balancing of the equities to reach an appropriate result
protective of the interests of both parties. "'s

Just as would be the case off the bench, where the Judge would
not hesitate to suggest what he would do if faced with a particular
situation but would not come out and tell another person what
they should do in that situation, Judge Altimari certainly had an
opinion as to what the appropriate remedy would be had he been
the trial court judge. But, to him the issue on appeal was never
whether, "as a matter of first impression, [hie would have
reached the same result as the district court in refusing to enjoin
the defendants." 46 Instead, Judge Altimari was satisfied if the
trial judge had an opportunity to review the facts and apply his or
her intellect and experience to independently do the right thing.
Conclusion
Judge Altimari had great faith in the capacity of people to do
the right thing. He acted on this principle both off the bench and
as a member of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Judge Altimari disdained bright-line tests and per se rules because
43Id. at

1326.

at 1329.
id. at 1330.

4id.
4

46Id.
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they interfered with the ability of trial judges to do the right
thing. Instead, he favored balancing tests administered on a caseby-case basis because such tests permit judges to rely on their
own wisdom and experience to find the right result and remedy in
any given case. Judge Altimari believed that in this manner,
whether or not he personally would have arrived at the same
outcome as the district court, the right thing would be done.
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